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ABSTRACT
The decentralized tax administration has been in place for over two decades in China 
since 1994. In March this year, National People’s Congress of China reviewed and 
approved the State Council Institutions Reform Plan and decided “we will reform the 
tax administrative system by merging the tax administrations on state and sub-national 
levels and assume it both tax and non-tax revenue administrative responsibility in 
the corresponding jurisdictions”. The article aims to explain to readers that China’s 
tax authorities have to a large extent absorbed common international practices 
and general experience. The history of the vertical arrangements of China’s tax 
administration is revisited through descriptive and comparative analysis. The reasons 
for the cancellation of the sub-national tax bureaus in China are analyzed followed 
by the international experience of the vertical structure of the tax administration. It 
is contended in the article that the reform of the vertical arrangements of the tax 
authorities is an attempt to deepen the reform of the fiscal system and promoting 
tax administrative agencies reform in the broad sense from the perspective of the 
modernization of the state governance system and governance abilities. The article 
concludes with a summary of several features of this reform.
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. Since 2018 year the subnational tax agencies in China will be abolished gradually 
and the separate system of vertical administrative agencies will officially end 
2. The removal of the subnational tax agencies is the result of balancing on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the separate tax collection agencies and new overall 
goal of reform in China. It is part of the reform of government institutions aimed at 
promoting the modernization of the state’s governance
3. The reform is making full use of the advanced experience of foreign countries
4. The reform is based on the construction of a general public service supply system, 
with tax administration agency as part of it. It is a step forward in the direction of 
specialization and independence of tax administrations
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Децентрализация налоговых органов существует в Китае уже более двух де-
сятилетий — с 1994 г. В марте этого года Национальный народный конгресс 
Китая рассмотрел и утвердил План реформирования институтов Государ-
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ственного совета. Данный план предусматривает реформирование системы 
налогового администрирования путем объединения налоговых органов госу-
дарственного и субнационального уровня и передачи им администрирования 
налоговых и неналоговых доходов в соответствующих юрисдикциях. В статье 
показано, что при проведении реформы налоговых органов Китая в значитель-
ной степени используются общепринятая международная практика и мировой 
опыт. История взаимодействия налоговых органов различного уровня в Ки-
тае изучается с помощью описательного и сравнительного анализа. Причины 
ликвидации налоговых органов субнационального уровня рассматриваются 
в сопоставлении с существующим международным опытом построения верти-
кальной организационной структуры налоговых органов. В статье утверждает-
ся, что реформа вертикальных механизмов взаимодействия налоговых органов 
различного уровня является попыткой углубить реформу налоговой системы 
и содействовать реформированию налоговых органов в широком смысле, как 
части общей модернизации системы государственного управления. Статья за-
вершается кратким изложением нескольких особенностей этой реформы.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговые органы, налоговые органы Китая, вертикальная структура налого-
вых органов, реформа системы налогового администрирования, международ-
ная практика налогового администрирования, Китай.
ОСНОВНЫЕ ВЫВОДЫ
1. С 2018 г. налоговые органы субнационального уровня в Китае будут посте-
пенно упразднены, а отдельная система вертикального построения налоговых 
органов будет официально ликвидирована
2. Устранение субнациональных налоговых органов является результатом ана-
лиза преимуществ и недостатков практики разделения органов налогового 
администрирования по различным уровням управления и изменения общей 
цели реформ в Китае и является частью реформы государственных учрежде-
ний, направленной на модернизацию государственного управления
3. Реформа в полной мере использует передовой опыт зарубежных стран
4. Реформа налоговых органов является частью формирования общедоступной 
системы государственных услуг, в части предоставления таких услуг налоговы-
ми органами и является шагом вперед в направлении специализации и неза-
висимости налоговых администраций
Introduction
The tax administration serves the 
tax system and aims to implement the 
tax law in a fair, efficient and effective 
manner and to obtain fiscal revenue. If a 
country lacks a good tax administration 
system, its tax laws perform practically 
less even no function. In this sense, the 
level of a country’s tax administration is 
critical to determine the success of the 
country’s tax system and its reform. For 
this reason, there are many scholars in 
the world who call for the goal of tax re-
form in developing countries and coun-
tries in transition to take into account the 
current situation and potential of their 
tax administration [1]. China’s tax sys-
tem is at the beginning of a new round 
of structural reform, and whether its 
existing tax administration system can 
support current and future reforms is an 
important issue that cannot be ignored. 
A sound tax administration system is the 
basis for the implementation of tax ad-
ministrative concepts and laws.
The term of so-called “structure of tax 
administrative agencies” usually consists 
of two aspects:
1. Vertical structure of the tax admin-
istrative agencies between the central and 
the subnational governments. In a coun-
try with a multi-level government, do 
governments at all levels need to set up 
their own tax administration systems and 
corresponding agencies to manage their 
respective revenues? That is, whether the 
central and the subnational governments 
should share the same set of tax adminis-
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tration systems or have separate ones of 
their own. 
2. Inner structures of the tax admin-
istrative agencies. Whether two or one 
set of agency is adopted for the vertical 
arrangement of the tax administration, 
the agencies as an organization should 
be arranged according to certain princi-
ples and operate based on certain models 
[2; 3]. That is, how the inner organiza-
tions should be structured in a modern 
tax administrative agency. 
This paper will center on the first 
aspect rather than the second one.
Although the state and subnational 
taxation bureaus were established sepa-
rately as an important part of China’s fiscal 
and taxation reform in 1994, other reforms 
related to the vertical structures of the tax 
administrative agencies have remained 
unchanged afterwards and nearly all the 
reform initiatives thereafter have been 
carried out around the modernization 
of the inner organization of the taxation 
agencies. State Administration of Taxation 
of China’s 2012 strategic goal of modern-
izing tax administration remains focused 
on the latter. In contrast, the reform of the 
vertical structures of the tax administra-
tive agencies lagged behind. Few varia-
tions have taken place in this aspect while 
China’s substantial tax laws, tax collection 
law and administrative technology have 
changed a lot in the past years. That’s why 
this article centers on this issue.
It was not until March this year that 
National People’s Congress of China re-
viewed and adopted the Party and Sate 
Council of China’s plan for Institutional 
Reform whereby the government has 
decided to reform the tax administrative 
system, to integrate the state and local tax 
agencies at the provincial level and below 
and to assume it specific responsibilities 
for both tax and non-tax revenue adminis-
tration within the corresponding jurisdic-
tions. This means that the subnational tax 
agencies will be abolished gradually and 
the separate system of vertical administra-
tive agencies will officially end.
It is still surprising when the reform 
plan, which was highly confidential be-
fore its release, was introduced although 
its contents have been discussed a lot 
for many years. The reasons behind this 
policy choice of the Chinese government, 
and how to perfect the tax administrative 
agencies in the future, are still in need of 
further discussion in the following reform. 
The article aims to explain to readers that 
China’s tax authorities have to a large 
extent absorbed common international 
practices and general experience. The ar-
ticle reviewed the history of the vertical 
arrangement of China’s tax administra-
tion through descriptive and comparative 
analysis. The reasons for the cancellation 
of the subnational tax agencies in China 
were given followed by discussing the 
international experience of the vertical ar-
rangements of the tax administrations. It 
is contended in the article that the reform 
of the vertical arrangements of the tax au-
thorities is an attempt to deepen the re-
form of the fiscal system and promoting 
tax administrative agencies reform in the 
broad sense from the perspective of the 
modernization of the state governance 
system and governance abilities. The ar-
ticle concludes with a summary of several 
features of this reform.
1. The history of vertical arrangement  
of tax administrative agencies in China
1.1. Before 1994:  
one set of decentralized agency
During the same period, China imple-
mented the fiscal contract system which 
actually is an approach to divide revenue 
between various levels of government. 
In most of the revenue-dividing schemes 
the ratio of addition income going to the 
central government was fixed. This led to 
most of the newly generated income flow-
ing to the subnational governments. When 
it comes to tax collection, the tax agencies 
affiliated with sub-national governments 
as the agents of central government had a 
strong opportunistic motive to erode tax 
revenues of the principal (i.e., the central 
government) and cause great damage to 
central government’s tax revenues. In the 
most difficult times, the central government 
had to borrow money from the subnational 
governments to meet the needs in expendi-
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ture which seriously hurt the authority of 
the central government [4]. Data show that 
the proportion of the central fiscal revenue 
in the national fiscal revenue (excluding 
debt income) dropped from 38.4% in 1985 
to 28.1% percent in 1992 (See Figure 1 be-
low). This Seriously weakened the central 
government’s macro-control capacity.
1.2. 1994–2018:  
two separate sets of tax agencies
In order to change this situation, 
strengthen the central government’s con-
trol of the tax revenues and raise the ra-
tio of the central tax revenues in total tax 
income, China switched its fiscal system 
from fiscal contracting system to tax shar-
ing system. The central government decid-
ed to establish a special tax administrative 
agency, the State Administration of Taxa-
tion (SAT) with its own branches at subna-
tional level, as one part of the fiscal reform 
in 1994, thereby introducing the separate 
state and subnational tax administrative 
agencies and assigning corresponding 
administration responsibilities on the ba-
sis of the a decentralized tax system. As 
it turns out, this move has played a criti-
cal role in reversing the financial strengths 
between the central and the subnational 
governments since 1994. In 1992 and 1993, 
before the implementation of the fiscal re-
form, the share of the central revenue in 
the fiscal revenue was only 28.1% or 22%. 
In 1994, the share rose to 55.7%, but it re-
mained above 50% percent after 1999, de-
spite a decline in subsequent years.
However, the separation of the tax 
agencies had negative impacts, too. On the 
one hand, the number of the personnel at 
the taxation agencies increased dramati-
cally, resulting in a substantial growth in 
the costs of taxation; on the other hand, 
the taxpayers have to face two kinds of 
tax administrative agencies and the com-
munication and coordination between the 
two kinds of agencies is insufficient which 
leads to higher compliance costs for the 
taxpayers. So the academic and policy cir-
cles had begun to explore the problem of 
restructuring tax administrative agencies 
as early as the around the year of 2000.
1.2.1. Discussions prior to the tax agency 
integration
Before then, a controversy has com-
parison in China between two distinct 
groups, i.e., the “integration” group and 
the “separation” group. The former ad-
vocated the merge of the state and sub-
national tax administrative agencies, be-
lieving that the agency integration would 
significantly reduce the administrative 
costs, save social resources and increase 
management efficiency and degree of 
taxpayer satisfaction. The latter, i.e., the 
“separation” group who favors maintain-
ing the ongoing separation between the 
state and subnational tax administrations 
but splitted in how to keep them separate. 
To sum up, there were two views within 
the “separation” group generally: one was 
“collaborative tax administration”, i.e., to 
strengthen cooperation and integration 
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Figure 1. The ratio of central revenue to the total in China (1985–2014), %
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years)
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during the operational process on the ba-
sis of the ongoing agency separation sys-
tem; the other was to readjust the subna-
tional tax agencies’ administrative scope 
on the basis of the separation between two 
levels of tax administration. The “separa-
tion” group did not advocate to eliminate 
tax administrative agencies on subna-
tional level mainly with the intention that 
China would switch its tax system from 
mail levy upon goods and services to 
upon individual persons; and subnational 
tax agencies would still have an important 
part to play as the proportion of personal 
income tax and property tax revenues in-
creased. Therefore, from the perspective 
of development, the shrinking scope of 
tax administration due to the present “re-
placement of business tax with VAT” (this 
will be discussed in detail below) does not 
justify the assertion to abolish the subna-
tional tax administrative agencies.
1.2.2. Reform in 2015: functional 
cooperation without agency merger
In terms of the policy, it is proposed 
in the fifth section of the Decision of the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of 
China to “deepen the reform of the fiscal 
and taxation systems” and to “improve 
the administrative system on the state 
and subnational levels”, yet no details are 
provided on how to “improve” it. The of-
ficial issuance and trial implementation 
of the Working Rules for the Cooperation 
between the State Taxation Bureaus and 
Subnational Taxation Bureaus (1.0 Edi-
tion) (hereinafter the “Working Rules”) as 
of July 1, 2015 implies the official recogni-
tion of “collaborative tax administration 
based on two separate agencies”), the view 
of the “separation” group. On November 
13 of the same year, the Program on Deep-
ening the Reform of State and Subnational 
Tax Administration was adopted at the 
meeting of the Central Steering Group for 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, 
stressing that the separation of the state 
and subnational tax administrative agen-
cies will remain unchanged with more 
cooperation on the one hand and confirm-
ing, on the other hand, that the functions 
of subnational agencies will expand fur-
ther and that its role to collect various local 
charges will be legitimatized. This marks a 
tentative conclusion of the “separation or 
integration” dispute that has been persist-
ing for years.
1.2.3. Institutional consolidation  
in 2018-abolition of the subnational tax 
administrative agency
Nevertheless, the collaborative tax 
administration based on two separate 
agencies is only a phase reform measure. 
The possibility of institutional consolida-
tion is not therefore excluded from the 
policy option. After two years of silence 
on the subject, the Central Committee of 
the Communist party of China (CPC), at 
its third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC, 
put forward a proposal on the reform of 
the party and state institutions. Then the 
National Congress turned it into law in 
March, 2018. Its main contents include: 
1. The integration of the state and local 
tax authorities at the provincial level and 
below. This means that China will have 
only one set of tax administrative agency 
in the future.
2. The integration of tax, social securi-
ty contribution and other non-tax revenue 
administration operations within the cor-
responding jurisdictions. This means that 
the subnational tax agencies will be abol-
ished gradually and the separate system 
of vertical administrative agencies will 
officially end.
3. The subnational tax agencies ac-
cepts the dual leadership of State Admin-
istration of Taxation of China and the pro-
vincial government, but mainly by State 
Administration of Taxation of China.
This article discusses the logic be-
hind this reform. The author points out 
that the removal of the subnational tax 
agencies is the result of balancing on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the 
separate tax collection agencies and mak-
ing full use of the advanced experience of 
foreign countries in the context of chang-
ing external environment. It is part of the 
reform of government institutions aimed 
at promoting the modernization of the 
state’s governance.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2018. T. 4, № 3. С. 223–235
228
ISSN 2412-8872
2. Analysis of the reasons  
for the merger of China’s tax 
administrative agencies
In any country, the vertical arrange-
ment of its tax authorities are not set up in 
an isolated way. It is an important part of 
a country’s fiscal system, economic insti-
tution and state governance system. The 
aim of separating tax agencies in 1994 is 
to increase central governments fiscal and 
macro-regulating capability and to meet 
the needs of establishing a socialist mar-
ket economy as well. In the past 20 years, 
the overall goal of the reform has changed 
from establishing and improving the so-
cialist market economy to promoting the 
modernization of the governance system 
and government capability of the state. 
The settings of the tax organization should 
be kept step with this. At the same time, 
great changes have taken place in the in-
ternal and external environment of tax ad-
ministration, and the shortcomings of the 
separate structure have been highlighted 
in the new context.
2.1. Both administrative costs  
and compliance costs have greatly 
increased under the separate structure
On the side of administrative cost it is 
easy to imagine that two separate struc-
ture expands office spaces, equipment’s, 
personnel costs, operating costs and the 
like at least two folded compared with a 
single agency. Despite the lack of public 
data, a large number of personal surveys, 
interviews, and non-disclosure informa-
tion within the tax authorities support the 
above view.
As for the compliance costs, tax pay-
ers should submit their financial state-
ments and tax returns to two separate tax 
authorities, and have to deal with two 
agencies’ collection, administration and 
audits, which will definitely increase the 
cost of tax compliance.
2.2. The separate structure undermined  
the uniformity and authority of the tax law
China’s tax laws and regulations are 
too simplified, and even very vague in 
some aspects. So there is too much room 
for discretion in tax administration. Be-
cause of the different understanding of 
the tax law and out of the defense of own 
interests, two distinct interpretations of 
the same tax law often appear between the 
state and subnational tax agencies. This 
not only leaves taxpayers at a loss but also 
undermines the unity, the seriousness and 
the authority of the tax law.
2.3. A reversal of financial relations 
between the central and subnational 
governments
One important goal of the fiscal re-
form of 1994 is to increase the proportion 
of the central fiscal revenue to the total. 
Since then the ratio of the central rev-
enues went up rapidly which completely 
reversed the previous situation of “weak-
central government and strong local gov-
ernment”. In most subsequent years, the 
central financial resources accounted for 
about 50% percent of the country’s total 
fiscal revenue (See Figure 1). Although 
there has been a decline since 2010, the 
central government still has a relatively 
stronger financial position than the subna-
tional authorities in view of the fact that 
the local government has assumed most 
responsibility of public service provision 
in recent years.
Following the reversal of financial 
strength between the central and subna-
tional governments, the original reasons 
for establishing separate tax agencies for 
each governmental level are no longer es-
sential and, in this context, the high costs 
of keeping two sets of tax administrative 
agencies even more highlighted.
2.4. The original scope of administration 
for subnational tax agencies continued 
to shrink
In the past 24 years, China’s tax system 
has undergone two major changes leading 
to a reduction in the scope of tax admin-
istration by the subnational tax agencies. 
After the abolition of the agricultural tax 
in 2006, the administrative scope of the 
subnational bureaus was contracted for 
the first time, and this triggered a round 
of discussion about the issue of the merger 
of tax administrative agencies. The second 
round of discussion occurred as a result 
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of the pilot program to replace the busi-
ness tax with VAT in selected industries 
and areas as well as its introduction to all 
industries and the whole country subse-
quently. The business tax is the principal 
tax which once accounted for 20–70% tax 
revenues of subnational government. Fol-
lowing the progressive incorporation of 
the business tax as a major local tax into 
VAT (the reform has been was fully imple-
mented since May 1, 2016), the administra-
tive responsibilities of the sub-national tax 
agencies witnessed a substantial shrink-
age. That’s why whether the subnational 
agencies should be retained or abolished 
becomes more popular since then.
2.5. Electronization and improvement  
of tax administration system
China has made great progress in 
tax administrative technology in the past 
years. In particular, the implementation 
of the Gold Tax can complete the admin-
istration of all taxes, non-tax income, so-
cial security contributions and other fees. 
It helps the state administrative agency 
to get taxation data on subnational taxes. 
Technically speaking, the role of subna-
tional agency in collecting subnational 
taxes since its inception has no effect. 
At this time, the tax-sharing system still 
maintain but the current pattern of sepa-
rate administrative structure is not as in-
dispensable as before. Thus the merger 
of state and subnational tax authorities at 
the provincial level and below is a natural 
consequence.
3. What have we learned from 
international practices?
The vertical arrangement of tax ad-
ministrative agency is not a unique prob-
lem in China, the experience of other 
countries, especially advanced market 
economies, is undoubtedly of great refer-
ence to the reform of China’s tax adminis-
tration. Facts shows that China’s reform, 
to a large extent, absorbed international 
experience. To my opinion, the following 
three aspects are the most obvious.
3.1. The framework of fiscal 
decentralization
In the traditional fiscal decentraliza-
tion theory, whether different govern-
ments should establish its own tax ad-
ministrative agencies severs as a part of 
tax administration function assignment. 
In this sense, it is an important part of the 
fiscal system of a country. Quite a number 
of documents in support of establishing 
separate tax administrative agencies em-
phasize the importance of the separation 
of agencies to subnational tax revenues 
rights and corresponding fiscal autonomy. 
Observing from this perspective, we can 
find that the assessment on subnational 
governments’ fiscal autonomy or fiscal 
decentralization consists of an embedded 
structure as follows [5].
As Figure 2 shows that the fiscal sys-
tem (or the intergovernmental fiscal re-
lationship) is an integral system which 
involves a wide range of issues, such as 
the arrangement of the fiscal expenditure 
Extent of  fiscal autonomy 
on subnational level
(i.e. fiscal decentralization)
Extent of autonomy 
in taxation
Extent of autonomy in
the right to issue bonds 
and its allocation
Extent of autonomy 
in fiscal expenditure
The autonomy in tax 
spliting
The atutonomy of tax 
administration
The power to develop 
tax laws and tax policies
Figure 2. Extent of fiscal autonomy on subnational level
Source: Drafted by the author with reference to [5]
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rights and responsibilities among govern-
ments at various levels, the division of 
government revenues (including those 
from taxation), the structure and model 
of transfer payment between the govern-
ments as well as the right to issue bonds 
and its allocation.
Generally, three parts of fiscal de-
centralization (Line 2 in the chart) must 
be coordinated with each other. That is 
why all the above factors should be tak-
en into account in designing the system 
of fiscal decentralization [6]. On the ba-
sis of this point of view, it is a natural 
question whether the fiscal decentraliza-
tion and the tax decentralization as one 
of the most important parts of the for-
mer, should be extended to tax adminis-
tration? Or, does fiscal decentralization 
inevitably requires that the governments 
at different levels have tax administra-
tive agencies of their own and exercise 
their tax administrative authority inde-
pendently [7; 8]?
3.2. Inspiration from international 
experience
Though this question has not been 
included in the existing fiscal decentral-
ization theory, relevant country-specific 
studies can provide valuable references 
for us. From international practices the 
following consensuses have been reached 
about the vertical structure of tax adminis-
trative agencies at various level:
1. The question whether subnational 
taxes should be administrated in a decen-
tralized way should be considered within 
the fiscal system of specific country. Fiscal 
decentralization does not necessarily re-
quire the decentralization of tax admin-
istration, let alone separate tax adminis-
trative agencies. Related researches, for 
instance, [1; 7; 8] indicate that no direct 
relationship exists between the extent of 
subnational tax autonomy and the ex-
tent of the decentralization of tax admin-
istration. That is, the separation of tax 
administrative agencies is not required 
necessarily even under decentralized fis-
cal systems.
2. The separation of taxation agencies is 
neither a necessary nor sufficiency condition 
for fiscal decentralization. In practice, na-
tions use many different alternatives for 
administering subnational taxes [8]. Ef-
fective fiscal decentralization should not 
start from the side of income, not to men-
tion the tax administration authorities, 
but from the expenditure side instead. 
Many developing counties did not get 
the expected returns in the process of fis-
cal decentralization due to the erroneous 
sequence of decentralization they chose 
which gave priority on revenue-sharing 
rather than governmental responsibility 
assignment. This also put their financial 
and political structure into an unsteady, 
risky situation.
3. The decentralized agencies leads to 
the problems of reverse incentives and higher 
taxation costs even if it is helpful in increas-
ing the autonomy of the local governments, 
which may result in more complicated tax 
administration as well. So all the possible 
gains and losses of different administra-
tive models should be weighed before the 
choice is made.
4. The structure of tax administrative 
agencies is closely related to the specific po-
litical, economic, cultural and historical con-
ditions of particular countries and there is no 
“one size fits all” model [1; 6]. The specific 
situation of each country as well as the 
particular temporal and local conditions 
must be considered. It’s important that 
the pursuit and imitation of so-called 
“optimal” or “advanced” models must be 
avoided.
It is because of such complex factors 
which affect the vertical structure of the 
tax administrative agencies in a country 
that people hold different opinions and 
cannot reach an agreement in related 
policy debates and academic discussions. 
Therefore, each country’s specific choice 
is differentiated according to its national 
conditions [9].
3.3. Delivery and organizational 
arrangements of tax administration  
as a kind of public service
3.3.1. The Nature of Tax Administration
Our understanding of the nature 
of “tax administration” is of extreme 
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relevance to the model we choose to 
deliver “tax administration” as a pub-
lic service. People instinctively regard 
tax administration as a unidirectional 
wealth transfer enforced by the state for 
its own interest, instead of treating it as 
general public services. In fact, there is 
no essential difference between tax ad-
ministration and other public services 
such as national security, compulsory 
education and public health, among 
others. Tax administration is one of the 
public services that is mainly provided 
by the governments at all levels instead 
of other agents.
The supply of any public service im-
plies the questions of the financing and 
delivery of such service. The former 
means the acquisition of needed funds 
and the latter refers to the course of con-
verting finance into essential inputs to 
access the process of production and ob-
tain outputs, which inevitably involves 
the selection and arrangement of the de-
livering organizations. In respect of the 
organization selection for public services 
delivery, not only a wide range of theo-
retical frameworks that can be borrowed 
but also comparative institutional analy-
ses for various kinds of public services 
are available, both of which lay founda-
tions for the selection of the governance 
structure for the public goods delivery 
in practice [10–12]. However, the selec-
tion of the delivering organization for 
tax administration as one kind of public 
service, has not become a major research 
area of the theory on public service de-
livery though this theory has witnessed 
rapid development in the latest decades 
and has been applied to the choice of de-
livery organization of a large number of 
public services successfully. Therefore, 
it will make contributions in a couple of 
ways by applying the theory on the or-
ganization of public services delivery to 
the research of the arrangement of tax ad-
ministrative agencies. It not only extends 
the existing perspectives for the research 
of the vertical structure of tax administra-
tive agencies but also expands the exist-
ing applied research fields of the organi-
zation theory for public service delivery.
3.3.2. Pluralistic Modes  
of Public Service Delivery
As same as the financing structure of 
public services, the organizational struc-
ture of their delivery should be pluralis-
tic, too. That means the delivery process 
of the public services is not enforced by 
public departments only. This is a con-
sensus that has been reached for long in 
modern public goods theory. Govern-
ments at various levels may adopt the 
third-party organizations during the 
course of public services delivery, which 
is also applicable to delivery of tax ad-
ministrative as a service. These options 
include:
1. Government purchasing. Also called 
public service outsourcing, including pur-
chasing from other government organs, 
the market and social organizations. The 
government purchasing are applicable to 
those administrative functions that seem 
to be obviously “services” to the taxpay-
ers. Among the typical purchasing tar-
gets are tax services (e.g., call centers), IT 
infrastructure support, tax assessment. 
Those administrative functions, such as 
tax fraud investigations and enforced tax 
debt collection, among others, that are not 
easily regarded as “services” by the tax-
payers, are retained for implementation 
by tax administrative agencies themselves 
in most nations [13].
2. Commissioned delivery. E.g., the 
state governments commissioned to en-
gage in tax administration on behalf of 
the federal government, which prevails 
in Germany; and the central govern-
ment commissioned by most provinces 
in Canada to administer the income tax 
and the goods and services tax [7]. Com-
missioned delivery may be paid or non-
paid, as the case may be. Non-paid com-
mission is more often in cases of mutual 
commission.
3. Cooperative delivery. It often takes 
place for the consideration to improve 
the management efficiency and to in-
crease taxpayers’ satisfaction under de-
centralized tax administrative agencies 
at various level of government. It is typi-
cal in Canada and other federal nations 
in which the federal, state and local tax 
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administrative agencies cooperate with 
each other very effectively in informa-
tion exchange and tax administration de-
livery on behalf of each other. This does 
not exclude the exceptions of some other 
federal countries, e.g., Australia, among 
others, with independent separate tax 
agencies are separate where the adminis-
tration efficiency is greatly impacted due 
to the lack of statutory inter-agency co-
operation obligations, which can hardly 
be improved in terms of the systems as a 
result of the excessively independent tax 
administrative authority of the govern-
ments at various levels under the Consti-
tution [7].
4. Tax farming (i.e., administration 
by private agencies completely). Tax 
farming is one of the earliest tax admin-
istration pattern. When a country lacks 
sufficient tax administration capacity, 
it commissions the tax collection task 
to a person or its agency in the form of 
contract awarding to ensure its fixed tax 
revenues; all the tax income other than 
the contracted amount belongs to the 
contractor (i.e., the tax collector) and the 
tax collector bears all the risks in tax rev-
enues and administration. The tax farm-
ing system has not become extinct in the 
modern society and it exists in various 
forms in some least developed countries 
or regions where public administration 
lags behind [14; 15].
3.4. Professionalism and independence  
of revenue bodies
as an essential public service, tax 
administration is generally not different 
from other public services in nature; yet 
it is distinctive in the following two re-
spects:
Firstly, tax administration is highly 
professional and technical, which makes 
the incentive mechanism for the tax ad-
ministrative personnel more complex. 
The homogenous incentive focused on 
administrative promotion in modern 
bureaucratic system is applicable to 
universal public service providers. The 
highly professional public service de-
livery institutions, such as the taxation 
bureaus and the customs, among others, 
nevertheless, are often gathering places 
of more professional and technical as 
well as managerial personnel in more 
diversified types and such motivation is 
evidently insufficient if they have to go 
through the narrow passage to admin-
istrative promotion like the public ser-
vants in general. The second is about the 
“negative” nature of tax administrative 
services relative to other public services. 
In the modern context of statutory taxa-
tion, the tax administrative agencies, as 
typical law enforcement units, often play 
their part in a “negative” manner due to 
the rigid restriction upon their discre-
tionary power.
The professionalism of the tax ad-
ministrative agencies and the “negative” 
nature of their administration services 
lead to the requirement for their relative 
independence. Whether affiliated to the 
ministries of finance or not, most of the 
tax agencies in major OECD countries 
and non-OECD countries in the investi-
gation mentioned above enjoy a varied 
extent of independence. There is even a 
radical point of view that the tax admin-
istrative agencies may develop as inde-
pendent agents outside the governments 
at all levels which fulfill lawful and high-
ly efficient collection of revenues in a 
negative manner. Influenced by this idea 
revenue authorities (RAs) with various 
level of autonomy and different scope of 
function have been adopted as an alter-
native delivery model for improved ad-
ministration efficiency and their perfor-
mance on revenues collection has been 
explored [16]. 
In the mean time, the separation of 
the operating divisions from the admin-
istrative divisions in tax administrative 
agencies as well as establishing corre-
sponding independent technical promo-
tion system for the operating depart-
ments have become a common option 
for all countries in the reconstruction 
of the internal structure of modern tax 
administrative agencies. Increasing im-
portance has been attached to this trend 
in the ongoing reform of the inside gov-
ernance of the tax administrative agen-
cies in China, too. It is explicitly stated in 
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the Program for Further Improving the 
Reform of the State and Subnational Tax 
Administrative System promulgated to 
the general public in late 2015 that it is 
imperative to “implement the system 
of professional ranks of the public ser-
vants” and “apply the appointment sys-
tem to highly professional positions” to 
“provide solutions to the lack of profes-
sional personnel”.
4. Functional integration  
of revenue bodies
Currently there is an international 
trend for the unification and integration 
of tax revenue bodies functions in order 
to improve the operational efficiency of 
the tax administrative agencies [17–19]. 
According to the comparative study is-
sued by [13] on the tax administration 
in major countries, the taxation agen-
cies are integrated with the customs (or 
play the role of the customer) in 13 out 
of 34 investigated OECD members and 
the same integration of agencies or func-
tions takes place in 6 out of 22 non-OECD 
members. Moreover, the social security 
tax is collected by the taxation agencies 
on behalf in 13 of the 32 OECD mem-
bers under investigation where the so-
cial security tax/fee is collected, and the 
same happens in 7 out of 18 non-OECD 
countries in which the social security tax 
is posed. The majority of the taxation 
agencies in all investigated countries 
fulfill the function of the collection ad-
ministration of non-tax revenues with 
the tax administrative agencies in some 
countries also execute the function of 
welfare project administration.
Currently there is an international 
trend for the unification and integra-
tion of tax revenue bodies functions in 
order to improve the operational effi-
ciency of the tax administrative agen-
cies [17; 18; 20]. According to the com-
parative study issued by [13] on the tax 
administration in major countries, the 
taxation agencies are integrated with 
the customs (or play the role of the cus-
tomer) in 13 out of 34 investigated OECD 
members and the same integration of 
agencies or functions takes place in 6 out 
of 22 non-OECD members. Moreover, 
the social security tax is collected by the 
taxation agencies on behalf in 13 of the 
32 OECD members under investigation 
where the social security tax/fee is col-
lected, and the same happens in 7 out of 
18 non-OECD countries in which the so-
cial security tax is posed. The majority of 
the taxation agencies in all investigated 
countries fulfill the function of the collec-
tion administration of non-tax revenues 
with the tax administrative agencies in 
some countries also execute the function 
of welfare project administration.
Conclusion
Reasonable vertical structure of tax 
agency serves as the foundation of mod-
ern tax administration system. This article 
analyses the reform of vertical arrange-
ment of China’s tax authorities starting 
in 2018. It points out that this reform, as 
a part of China State Council institutional 
reform, is not just a reform of fiscal sys-
tem, but aiming at improving the gover-
nance system and governance capability 
of China by integrating tax agencies at 
central and subnational levels. It shows 
the following characteristics:
1. The main purpose of the merger is 
to meet the development requirements 
of the new era, promote the moderniza-
tion of the state governance system and 
governance capacity and provide sup-
port for achieving high quality develop-
ment by improving the efficiency of the 
government’s operation and the cost of 
taxpayers’ tax compliance. 
2. The reform is a decision made in the 
light of China’s actual conditions and has 
fully absorbed international experience.
3. The reform is based on the construc-
tion of a general public service supply sys-
tem, with tax administration agency as a 
public service production organizations as 
part of it.
4. The reform, which goes beyond 
the narrow tax administration, includes 
the broad tax administration in general. 
In addition, it is a step in the direction of 
specialization and independence of tax 
administrations.
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